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Abstract
Throughout the development sector there has been a pronounced call for new fundingmechanisms to address the climate
crisis, and much of this is focused on attracting private sources of capital to fund ‘bankable’ projects in climate-vulnerable
cities throughout the world. Enacted amidst a 21st century landscape of interlocking financial, epidemiological, and eco-
logical crises, this call features an urgent narrative of ‘resilience-amidst-crisis’ that promotes large-scale, profitable invest-
ments as a form of green growth through debt-financing. The political orchestration and administration of new funding
mechanisms (particularly green bonds and sustainable bonds) requires a new form of climate governance focused on
the channeling of enormous sums of private capital through an assemblage of intermediaries toward profitable climate
projects. This article interrogates this trend in climate finance, revealing that the framing, monetization, and orchestration
of climate projects is dependent on a narrative of crisis capitalism deeply rooted in a colonial mindset of exploitation and
profit. A key aim of this article is to deconstruct the contemporary dominance of crisis-oriented development and suggest
the goal of decolonizing and democratizing the climate finance system.
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1. Introduction
Cities in the 21st century are attempting amulti-pronged
response to climate change in an uncertain landscape
of interlocking crises. While urban policymakers con-
tend with the immediacy of climate hazards, most are
also grappling with global economic recession, a loom-
ing global debt crisis, a widespread—but regionally
differentiated—housing crisis, a persistent global pan-
demic, and a wave of social unrest and political volatil-
ity that stems from a range of structural issues (e.g.,
systemic racism, rising nationalism, increased author-
itarianism, mismanagement, etc.). Indeed, 2020 may
have been the year that the rhetoric of crisis became
fully normalized in policy narratives, and this phe-
nomenon has potentially worrisome consequences for
equity and justice.
While narratives of crisis are employed at various
scales of politics and governance, this article addresses
the recent mainstreaming of crisis in the governance
of climate finance at the municipal scale. Cities are
presently targeted as the practical loci for climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation, and as such, have been highlighted
as important recipients for climate funding. This has
particular consequences for poorer cities of the global
South, many of which are struggling to gain access to the
funding and expertise needed to address overwhelming
infrastructure deficits. That assistance is crucial, because
the cost of climate-oriented development—particularly
adaptation infrastructure—is enormous. Some projec-
tions have suggested that investment in climate action
could be one of the largest ever mobilizations of invest-
ment capital, and one of the most profitable (New
Climate Economy, 2018).
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The confluence of these factors has produced a pre-
carious situation for some of the more vulnerable recip-
ients of climate finance. As multilateral agencies and
development organizations court a purportedly neces-
sary partnership with private financial institutions of the
global North, they have become focused on risk-averse
and profitable (or ‘bankable’) climate-related projects.
This partnership may be attractive to private investment,
but it requires intermediaries and recipients to navigate
an increasingly complex system of climate finance that
lacks oversight, accountability, and efficiency. In short,
while the more influential actors in this system push for
urgent action in the face of crisis, recipients are increas-
ingly forced into a potentially damning cycle of catastro-
phe, debt financing, and response.
This article interrogates some of the potential vulner-
abilities and injustices in the contemporary landscape
of climate finance. Ultimately, I argue that the framing,
monetization, and orchestration of crisis has become
a pervasive feature of climate governance and finance
since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Within the
past decade, the network of actors and intermediaries
involved in the governance of climate finance has grown
exponentially. At the same time, despite this diversity
of new actors, a narrative of climate action has become
increasingly mainstreamed. That narrative is largely an
export of the global North, and represents a ‘resilience-
amidst-crisis’ approach that is structurally embedded
within a colonial mindset (Quijano, 2000).
Following a brief discussion of methodology and
scale, this article introduces the relevant scholarship on
crisis capitalism and its relationship with climate finance,
emphasizing the ways that a neoliberal and colonial
rhetoric of resilience is used to normalize an ongoing
state of crisis and response. I then outline the ways in
which the governance of climate finance has evolved
since the global financial crisis. This includes a section on
the framing of the climate crisis as an urgent and expen-
sive challenge that requires private sector leadership.
The next section summarizes the new financial mecha-
nisms and strategies that have been created to engage
private capital. The following section then briefly dis-
cusses the actors involved in the orchestration of those
mechanisms and strategies. The article ends with a cri-
tique of this system, along with suggestions for strate-
gies to decolonize and democratize climate-oriented
development.
2. Scale and Methodological Approach
Critiquing climate finance and the climate development
sector introduces challenges of scale and methodology
that must be acknowledged. First, examining the role
of climate finance in urban development necessitates
a much broader examination of climate governance.
Cities are not isolated actors in climate development.
Funding major climate-oriented projects requires munic-
ipalities to seek out investment capital, forcing cities
into relationships with institutions and actors at multi-
ple scales, including multilateral agencies, state govern-
ments, regional non-government organizations, and a
host of intermediary actors. This is true of most cities
but particularly so of poorer cities who may lack the
credit rating or technical expertise needed to secure and
administer funding. Additionally, actions taken within
cities have a significant impact on surrounding com-
munities and regions, further complicating issues of
scale. As a result, while this article is largely focused on
urban projects and policies, it acknowledges the scalar
reach of its arguments, suggesting that such a lens is
necessary to critique the scope and complexity of cli-
mate finance.
Second, it is likely helpful to clarify what I mean
by ‘climate finance.’ For the purpose of this article,
I use the definition of climate finance introduced by the
Climate Policy Initiative (Falconer & Stadelmann, 2014,
p. 4): “‘Climate finance’ typically refers to the financial
resources paid to cover the costs of transitioning to a
low-carbon global economy and to adapt to, or build
resilience against, current and future climate change
impacts.” This is a broad definition. I use it intention-
ally because it captures the range of funding mecha-
nisms that have been referred to as ‘climate finance’ in
the development sector. Even though attempts at set-
ting definitions and parameters exist (see, for instance,
Brown, Bird, & Schalatek, 2010), the ways in which cli-
mate finance has been distributed constitutes a vast
spectrumof arrangements (Donner, Kandlikar, &Webber,
2016; Hall, 2017; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Indeed,
ambiguity, complexity, and lack of accountability in the
administration of climate finance is a primary justifica-
tion for this research.
Lastly, in terms of methodology, I rely upon a range
of disciplinary perspectives and primary sources of infor-
mation to evidence my arguments. In Section 3, I draw
from formative theoretical works on crisis and disaster
capitalism, the climate crisis, and critical works on the
rhetoric of resilience. For Sections 4 and 5, I reviewed
112 peer-reviewed scholarly works on green bonds, cli-
mate finance, and regionally-specific case studies of
urban climate-oriented development from the fields
of geography, economics, international policy, environ-
mental studies, sociology, and international develop-
ment. I located relevant case studies and peer-reviewed
analyses published between 2009 and 2021 in the fol-
lowing databases: EBSCO, JSTOR, and Google Scholar.
Of those, approximately 70 representative works were
cited. Additionally, I conducted a discourse analysis of
reports and promotional materials from approximately
40majormultilateral institutions, development agencies,
investment banks, private consulting firms, interurban
networks, and related organizations to identify and com-
pare the parallels in the rhetoric they employed (see
Table 1). The resulting analysis reveals a public cam-
paign amongst development agencies and organizations
at multiple scales to expand neoliberal ideals, engage
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Table 1. Primary sources (documents and reports) drawn from these organizations.
Development Agencies & Private Companies & Interurban Networks,
Multilateral Institutions Private Investment Banks Initiatives, & Think Tanks
• Adaptation Fund
• African Development Bank
• Asian Development Bank
• Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)
• European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD)
• Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD)
• United Nations (including subsidiaries
& affiliates)
• World Bank Group
• World Trade Organization
• Rockefeller Foundation
• Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities
• World Resources Institute
• World Bank Resilient Cities
• Banco Santander
• Bank of America
• Bank of China
• Credit Suisse
• Deutsche Bank
• DZ Bank AG
• Hannon Armstrong
• HSBC
• JP Morgan Chase & Co.
• Kearney
• McKinsey & Company
• Oliver Wyman
• Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience
Network (ACCCRN)
• C40
• Cities Climate Finance Leadership
Alliance
• Climate Action Network
• Climate Bonds Initiative
• Climate Leadership Group
• Climate Policy Initiative
• Communitas Coalition
• Compact of Mayors
• Global Commission on Economy and
Climate
• International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD)
• Local Governments for Sustainability
(ICLEI)
• LSE Cities
influential private capital, and employ strategic financial
mechanisms in response to crisis—a phenomenon that
scholars of crisis capitalismhave been concernedwith for
more than a decade.
3. Background: Questioning Crisis and Resilience in the
Era of Climate Change
Narratives of crisis have received a great deal of atten-
tion in the 21st century, although not always in name.
In a very real sense, the scholarship on disaster capi-
talism and the rhetoric of resilience is also the scholar-
ship of the framing andmanagement of crisis. Combining
these perspectives reveals a dual narrative of crisis and
resilience that facilitates a cycle of creative destruction,
investment, and response. This section briefly reviews
some of the scholarship that highlights the coloniality of
crisis capitalism and climate finance.
More than a decade ago, Klein (2007) introduced the
concept of ‘disaster capitalism’ to describe the ability of
powerful state actors and multilateral agencies to har-
ness crises as opportunities for the expansion of neolib-
eral ideals and specific financial mechanisms. This fram-
ing of crisis matches Schuller and Maldonado’s (2016,
p. 62) definition of ‘disaster capitalism’ as “national
and transnational governmental institutions’ instrumen-
tal use of catastrophe…to promote and empower a range
of private, neoliberal capitalist interests.” There is a
long history of framing disaster or crisis as a rhetorical
antecedent to exploitative policies, but by the end of the
first decade of the 21st century, it had become remark-
ably commonplace in policy discourse (Castree, 2010).
Indeed, responses to the September 11th terror attacks,
to the increasing severity and prevalence of ecological
disasters, and to financial crises have all been framed
as crises in need of reactive policy measures; in each
case the prescriptions involved the support and securi-
tization or advancement of specific, influential capital-
ist interests (Boin, Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Coaffee,
2009; Fletcher, 2012; Octavianti & Charles, 2018; Pyles,
Svistova, & Ahn, 2017).
While the terms ‘disaster capitalism’ and ‘crisis capi-
talism’ have been used interchangeably (see for instance,
Octavianti & Charles, 2018), in this article, I refer to ‘cri-
sis capitalism’ because it goes beyond implications of
an event (a singular disaster or catastrophe) to more
accurately refer to a systematic, ongoing condition of
instability, danger, and vulnerability. As Azmanova (2020,
p. 604) notes, since the financial collapse of 2007–2009,
we find ourselves stuck in a protracted state of crisis:
“Strategies for coping with the financial crisis have not
solved the larger social crisis; short-term crisis manage-
ment has become a new normal—we are stuck in per-
petual crisis management.” In the era of neoliberalism,
this state of perpetual crisis management has facilitated
new technocratic modes of development, new spheres
of investment, and new networks for the administration
of capitalist intervention (Harvey, 2010). Whether it be
the global financial crisis, the climate crisis, Covid-19, or
another crisis, these challenges are framed as persistent
challenges that requiremarket-based, capitalist interven-
tions with the aim of achieving resilience.
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Resilience is a concept taken from ecology, where it
is used to describe the ability of an ecosystem to ‘bounce
back’ from shocks and stresses. In climate development
circles, resilience has been used broadly to describe
the ability of urban ecosystems, infrastructures, and
entire communities to respond to and recover from cli-
mate hazards (Meerow & Stults, 2016). In many ways,
resilience has become a useful counter-discourse of
crisis. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change notes that, in response to the climate
crisis, we must take steps to ensure a sustainable and
resilient future. They define resilience as:
The ability of a system and its component parts to
anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from
the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and effi-
cient manner, including through ensuring the preser-
vation, restoration, or improvement of its essential
basic structures and functions. (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2012, p. 3)
Some scholars have noted that, over the past decade,
resilience has become a ‘global urban policy project’
widely adopted by international organizations, think
tanks, and practitioners throughout the climate develop-
ment sector (Webber, Leitner, & Sheppard, 2020, p. 1).
Its malleability has allowed various actors to appropriate
it as an organizing principle, a developmental road map
with flexible measures of assessment, and most impor-
tantly for this article: a useful vocabulary to frame neolib-
eral strategies of risk management (Bigger & Webber,
2020; Webber et al., 2020). And while the basic concept
of resilience is by no means fundamentally problematic,
its appropriation and employment in climate finance is
worrisome, as it normalizes the climate crisis as a mode
of creative destruction in need of perpetual innovations,
investment, and rebuilding.
Whether employed reactively in the wake of a dis-
aster or strategically in climate adaptation initiatives,
discourses of resilience are employed as a means to
promote new development initiatives that are largely
top-down, technocratic, and costly. Furthermore, they
consistently overlook histories of colonial exploitation
and structural injustice, thereby exacerbating, rather
than alleviating, disparities and vulnerabilities (Evans
& Reid, 2014; McDonnell, 2020). As Ranganathan and
Bratman (2019, p. 2) note, contemporary market-driven
and technocratic visions of resilience “privilege design
solutions and externally imposed ideas for community
cohesion, while eliding the structural inequalities that
make particular groups vulnerable to climate threats
in the first place.” Moreover, current policy discourses
that employ the narrative of resilience-amidst-crisis are
deeply embedded in colonial knowledge, supremacy,
and violence (Reid, 2019; Serrano-García, 2020; Whyte,
in press).
The resilience-amidst-crisis narrative referenced
throughout this article is key to understanding the ways
that climate finance represents a mechanism of colo-
nialist interventionism. By resilience-amidst-crisis, I am
referring to a three-part narrative that portrays a cri-
sis as unprecedented and urgent, casts crisis victims
as resilient subjects, and frames solutions in terms of
access to capital markets, credit, and technocratic exper-
tise. This narrative serves a dual function. The framing
of crisis as unprecedented and urgent justifies policies
that react to the present causes of the situation, thereby
allowing the historical and structural causes of crisis to be
obfuscated (Whyte, in press). At the same time, employ-
ing a resilience-amidst-crisis discourse romanticizes the
survival capacity of disaster victims and fetishizes the
resiliency of marginalized communities, thereby facili-
tating a disconnect that makes it easier to rationalize
austere modes of governance and debt-bondage (Bigger
& Webber, 2020; Perry, 2020; Serrano-García, 2020).
Crisis capitalism relies on the exercise of creating
resilient, but compliant, subjects who become depen-
dent on a system of debt finance disguised as sustain-
able development. Evans and Reid (2014, p. 8) note
the “enthusiasm” with which ideologues of sustainable
development impose the language of resilience, ulti-
mately suggesting that the “making of resilient subjects
and societies fit for neoliberalism by agencies is based
upon a degradation of the political capacities of human
beings.” Framing resilient development as an impera-
tive that must be executed quickly to save vulnera-
ble communities—while simultaneously restricting their
political agency and trapping them in a system of debt
bondage—firmly situates crisis capitalism within a colo-
nial mindset of exploitation and supremacy.
It should be noted that crisis capitalism and its
employment of a resilience-amidst-crisis narrative
should be considered within the broader context of the
neoliberalization of nature that occurred in response
to the simultaneous challenges of climate crisis and
economic crisis (see for instance Bumpus & Liverman,
2011; Castree, 2010; Fletcher, 2012; While, Jonas, &
Gibbs, 2010, etc.). It also should be considered in light
of works that consider the financialization of everyday
life (see, for instance, Karaagac, 2020). This body of lit-
erature serves as a useful foundation for understanding
the financialization and governance of the climate cri-
sis. Their speculations about newly created carbon mar-
kets (Fletcher, 2012), carbon offsets and trading schemes
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2011), and carbon control and gov-
ernance (While et al., 2010) remain highly relevant, but
their discussion of crisis and power is most useful for
this article.
These scholars and others focus on a trend that
was just emerging at the time of their writing. That is,
addressing the climate crisis introduces an extremely
profitable frontier for financialization, investment, and
influence. That frontier thrives on capitalism’s ability to
exploit the crises that it creates while also extracting
value from vulnerable ecosystems, institutions, and peo-
ple. Before addressing this further, it is necessary to
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provide a brief overview of the ways that systems of
climate governance and finance have merged through
the framing, monetization, and orchestration of crisis.
The following section argues that a resilience-amidst-
crisis narrative has been recently focused at the munic-
ipal scale. In short, the city and its citizens are then cast
as resilient subjects whose response to the climate crisis
is dependent on significant streams of investment and
technocratic expertise to be channeled toward climate-
oriented infrastructure and development.
4. Framing and Monetizing Crisis: Urgent, Urban,
and Investable
Throughout the past decade of compounding crises, mul-
tilateral agencies have mainstreamed a useful narrative
of climate action. That message focuses on expanding
markets to poorer regions through debt-finance mecha-
nisms (Soederberg, 2013) and facilitating the role of pri-
vate interests (through both philanthropic donors and
private firms) in the governance of climate-oriented
development (Graham, 2017; Seitz & Martens, 2017).
This occurred alongside an increased focus on cities
as the preferred sites of financial investment and cli-
mate action—a strategy that gained recognition in aca-
demic, institutional, and government literatures (Angelo
& Wachsmuth, 2020; Rosenzweig, Solecki, Hammer, &
Mehrotra, 2010). As Angelo and Wachsmuth (2020)
note, climate change has provided the context for the
global institutionalization of urban sustainability and
climate action, with multilateral organizations, philan-
thropic foundations, and development agencies focus-
ing much of their attention on cities as the most effec-
tive scale of intervention. This began in earnest in the
decade following the financial crisis, with examples like
the World Bank publishing its Cities and Climate Change:
An Urgent Agenda, United Nations Habitat beginning its
Cities and Climate Change Initiative, the OECD publishing
various analyses on Cities and Climate Change, and a host
of new initiatives mainstreaming a narrative that cham-
pioned the relative flexibility and speed at which cities
can address climate change.
Several scholars have suggested this shift constitutes
a new mode of urban development known as ‘climate
urbanism’ (Castán Broto, Robin, & While, 2020; Long
& Rice, 2019). As Robin and Castán Broto (2020) note,
climate urbanism as a strategy for climate action is
not a homogenous approach: It remains a contested
concept. This article first critiques the dominant narra-
tive of climate urbanism before discussing diverse and
subaltern approaches that contest that narrative. That
dominant narrative prioritizes carbon control, climate
resilient infrastructure, and technological fixes in order
to safeguard the economic generative capacity of cities.
Depoliticizing in nature, it suggests that urgent action
is needed to address the climate crisis, that the city is
the logical scale for climate action, and that new finan-
cial mechanisms are needed to boost investment in the
type of costly climate projects that are necessary for a
‘resilient’ future (Long & Rice, 2019).
The widespread adoption of that narrative has
allowed it to be proliferated quickly through multiple
scales of climate governance, with new models, meth-
ods and experimentation answering the call (Bulkeley &
Castán Broto, 2013; Castán Broto, 2017; Montero, 2020).
However, the reality of delivering sufficient capital to
fund major climate projects has remained a herculean
task (Bigger & Webber, 2020). Indeed, the amount of
money needed for effective climate action is stagger-
ing. Estimates range from $1,6 trillion per year to $3,8
trillion per year between 2016 and 2050 just to meet
low-carbon energy transition goals (Clark et al., 2019),
and as much as $90 trillion overall between 2015 and
2030 to meet the needs for climate resilient infrastruc-
ture (Global Commission on Economy andClimate, 2016).
That outlook has worsened since 2020, as widespread
social unrest and economic uncertainty around the
Covid-19 epidemic has exposed structural vulnerabili-
ties in emergency response, public health systems, and
local economies (Flavelle, 2020; Salas, Shultz, & Solomon,
2020). Furthermore, these challenges are unfolding
against the largest potential debt crisis in decades, which
threatens developing and middle-income countries with
over $130 billion in debt service payments (Stiglitz &
Rashid, 2020).
With this in mind, it is easy to see why the pri-
vate sector is being so heavily courted. The amount
of unspent private capital in the global North has
grown to record levels (Karsh & Robertson, 2020), result-
ing in an overabundance of idle Northern capital in
search of investable projects (Bigger & Webber, 2020).
Aside from renewable energy and sustainable transporta-
tion projects, however, private firms have had mini-
mal interest in investing in potentially risky, low-return
projects. This is especially true for large-scale, capital-
intensive infrastructure projects, which were tradition-
ally financed by the public sector or multilateral devel-
opment aid. Yet, those conventional sources may be
drying up. The Covid-19 epidemic is testing already-
strained government budgets, and the financial situ-
ation of multilateral aid organizations has been trou-
bled by discontinuity and a reduction in member fund-
ing. In response, multilateral and development agencies
are now casting themselves as knowledge brokers and
interlocutors that serve to connect private capital with
‘bankable’ climate projects. As the executive vice presi-
dent of the International Finance Corporation noted in a
2016 report:
There has never been a better time to invest in cli-
mate solutions….International Finance Corporation
stands ready to support the private sector in
its quest to invest more in industries that will
improve the climate and yield healthy returns on
investment….Working together, we can reduce cli-
mate’s impact on the poor, while creating new
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markets for the private sector. (International Finance
Corporation, 2016, p. v)
Despite an abundance of available capital, private
investors were relatively slow to engage in climate
finance, particularly in adaptation projects like the con-
struction of defensive sea walls, climate-proofing util-
ity infrastructures, enhancing the resiliency of water
and agriculture systems, and improving emergency
response systems. With little support from the pri-
vate sector, some of the most significant infrastruc-
ture needs remain unfinanced; while increasing, adap-
tation projects accounted for only 12% of all climate
finance commitments at the end of 2019 (International
Development Finance Club, 2019).
As a result, engaging the private sector has taken
priority in the promotional documents and public
actions of the World Bank, United Nations, OECD,
Global Commission on the Economy and Environment,
Rockefeller Foundation, World Resource Institute, Asian
Development Bank, and others. Collectively, these orga-
nizations have pitched climate finance as an investment
opportunity with reliable returns and—following the
lead of theWorld Bank—have established themselves as
necessary arbiters and intermediaries of this global pro-
gram. As (then) president of the World Bank President
Jim Yong Kim noted in 2016: “It is not just about trying to
persuade donors and financiers to put up more money,
although we are definitely trying to do that, but it is also
about creating the environment that crowds in a lotmore
financing” (United Nations, 2016).
In response, organizations have focused their
attention on identifying new markets and projects
(International Finance Corporation, 2016), making exist-
ing markets and projects more investor-friendly (Bigger
&Webber, 2020), and creating political and financial risk
assurance to encourage private lenders to invest. For
instance, an International Finance Corporation (2016,
p. v) report on climate investment opportunities states
their intention of “providing information for investors,
banks and companies about the most attractive climate
investment opportunities, while offering governments
a set of best practice policies and measures that have
been proven to attract private investment.” A report
from the Climate Policy Initiative (Buchner et al., 2019)
encourages governments to “identify the business mod-
els that can best enable private investment at scale,”
and the Asian Development Bank notes the importance
of using financial policies to make climate investment
more attractive: “The role of fiscal policy in increasing
the rate of return for green projects and thereby elevat-
ing the private sector’s share in these projects is crucial”
(Sachs, Woo, Yoshino, & Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2019, p. 6).
The United Nations Green Climate Fund has offered “a
wide range of financial products including grants, conces-
sional loans, subordinated debt, equity, and guarantees”
in order to adapt and “overcome market barriers for
private finance” (Ephraim, 2019). Yet, while a host of
financial mechanisms and policies have been proposed
to engage the private sector, nothing has been as suc-
cessful as the growth of green bonds.
Traditional sources of funding such as grants, for-
givable loans, and other mechanisms have remained
a part of aid and finance packages from donor coun-
tries and philanthropic organizations, but in recent years,
the growth of green bonds has emerged as the most
important form of climate finance in terms of overall
share of capital investment in climate-focused projects
(Jones, Baker, Huet, Murphy, & Lewis, 2020). Relatively
insignificant prior to 2010, green bond issuance rose to
$323 billion by the end of 2019, eclipsing earlier projec-
tions (Kuchtyak & Davison, 2020). Even as the Covid-19
pandemic threatened to slow down the green bond mar-
ket in 2020, the EU commission announced that approxi-
mately 30% of the €750 billion Next Generation EU recov-
ery plan will take the form of green bonds, ensuring their
continued significance in climate finance (Khan, 2020).
Like conventional ‘vanilla’ bonds, green bonds are
instruments that allow borrowing organizations and insti-
tutions access to capital while providing investors with
a relatively risk averse, low return investment option.
Paraphrasing Jones et al. (2020, p. 50): On the issuer side,
green bonds typically allow access to large amounts of
capital that can be acquired more cheaply than through
direct bank loans, and as such, are an especially attrac-
tive option for expensive projects like major infrastruc-
ture initiatives focused on adaptation. This makes them
an ideal fit for development agencies whose recent
focus—as previouslymentioned—has been to unlock pri-
vate capital and funnel investment to priority climate
projects through private-public partnerships.
As scholars have noted, however, the rapid growth
and popularization of green bonds is not without
its faults (Bigger & Millington, 2020; Clark, Reed, &
Sunderland, 2018; Jones et al., 2020). Indeed, the trans-
formation of climate finance has introduced numer-
ous concerns about ambiguity in climate finance reg-
ulation (Hall, 2017), the de-politicizing effects of a
mainstreamed message of adaptation (Scoville-Simonds,
Jamali, & Hufty, 2020), the denial or lack of evalua-
tion of social dimensions of projects (García-Lamarca &
Ullström, 2020), and the likelihood of reviving a new iter-
ation of structural adjustment policy reminiscent of the
Washington Consensus (Bigger & Webber, 2020).
Green bonds provide a model to monetize the cli-
mate crisis, but this model works for other crises as well.
The recent introduction of ‘sustainable bonds’—bonds
that are applied to finance a combination of green and
social projects—has allowed the green bondmodel to be
reformulated for investors seeking to add a social dimen-
sion to their portfolios.Writing in Environmental Finance,
a DZ Bank representative recently declared the 2020s
“the decade of sustainable bonds” (Pratsch, 2020). After
the obligatory tone of urgency in his framing of crisis:
“Time is running out. The point of no return is approach-
ing,” Pratsch announced a “green goes rainbow’’ trend in
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 51–63 56
development finance. The ambiguous regulatory struc-
ture of green bonds applies similarly to sustainable
bonds, and most recently ‘Covid-19 bonds,’ the latter of
which have no clear definition or regulation, but stillman-
aged to raise $150 billion between March and June of
2020 (Hirtenstein, 2020).
This is no coincidence. Throughout the Covid-19 cri-
sis, multilateral agencies have actively promoted the
green bond model as a way to further engage the pri-
vate sector for other crises. In a recent report, the
International Finance Corporation suggested that a suc-
cessful response to the Covid-19 crisis will:
Mirror the approach that we at the International
Finance Corporation are using to tackle the climate
crisis: that investors, businesses and financial institu-
tions must lead the way….It’s a business plan that’s
not only positive for the environment, but also good
for people and profitability. (Klein, 2020, p. 1)
As the report’s title suggests, private sector influence
is an apparent ‘sustainable’ solution in an era of crisis:
“When it comes to sustainable finance in the COVID era,
let the private sector lead the way” (p. 1).
It is important to note that the monetization of crisis
has not happened in a vacuum. A complex assemblage
of agencies, institutions, and networks is involved in the
administration of new financemechanisms, andmany of
these actors have a history of advancing specific political
and economic agendas. The following section addresses
this issue before advocating for the decolonization of cli-
mate finance and climate governance.
5. Orchestrating Crisis: Old and New Actors in Urban
Climate Governance
Numerous scholars have written about the evolution of
urban climate governance (see for instance, Anguelovski
& Carmin, 2011; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Gordon& Johnson,
2017). Their work is important context for this section,
which focuses on the recent surge of intermediate actors
in the system. That surge can largely be attributed to
three reasons: the need to secure funding in the wake of
the 2007–2009 financial crisis, the commitments (how-
ever loosely enforced) introduced in the 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement, and lastly, the aforementioned push
to engage the private sector in climate finance. The
rapid growth of actors in urban climate governance has
resulted in a complex assemblage of organizations, insti-
tutions, and agencies. Scholars have referred to the
“entangled web…of the global urban resilience complex”
(Webber et al., 2020, p. 5), the growing “dominance
of intermediaries” in climate finance (Chaudhury, 2020,
p. 1), and the “Cambrian explosion of organizations,
norms, contributions, commitments, and other institu-
tions” involved in climate governance (Abbott, 2017).
While many of the most influential actors (particularly
multilateral agencies like the World Bank, or philan-
thropic organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation)
pre-date the 21st century rise in climate-oriented orga-
nizations, most have appeared in the past decade or so.
Because of their number and novelty, it has remained
difficult—if not impossible—to keep track of new pro-
grams, intermediaries, and transnational investment
relationships. The scholarship on intermediary actors
in climate governance (see, for instance, Bäckstrand,
Zelli, & Schleifer, 2018; Chaudhury, 2020; Gordon &
Johnson, 2017) suggests the necessity of experts and
institutions for the following: (1) To identify ‘bankable’
climate projects and connect funding sources to local
municipalities; (2) to provide knowledge and expertise
to municipalities with minimal experience in the types
of climate adaptation projects promoted by influential
organizations; (3) to assign credit ratings to municipali-
ties and augment the capacity of cities to secure higher
credit ratings so as to gain access to pools of funding; and
(4) to administer, assess, and create accountability mech-
anisms for streams of finance.
As mentioned previously, multilateral organiza-
tions like the United Nations, World Bank, and IMF
have recast themselves as knowledge brokers, prob-
lem solvers, and necessary ‘middlemen’ in financing
climate action (Chaudhury, 2020; Scoville-Simonds et al.,
2020). Partneringwith corporate entities, influential phil-
anthropic organizations, and other private actors has
been key to their statedmission of unlocking private cap-
ital. Beyond traditional actors, a host of transmunicipal
networks (such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,
the Covenant of Mayors, Cities for Climate Protection,
and others) promote cities as pragmatic leaders capable
of enacting policies and disseminating information and
expertise to their municipal peers (Bansard, Pattberg,
& Widerberg, 2017). Additionally, a host of institu-
tional think-tanks and non-profits like Earth Institute
Resilient Cities, World Resource Institute, the Resilient
Cities Catalyst, and others serve as consultants, project
designers, brokers, and analysts. More recently, a host of
Project Preparation Facilities have emerged specifically
to serve as intermediaries between new sources of cap-
ital and state and local actors in order to develop bank-
able, investment-ready infrastructure projects (Perera,
Uzsoki, & Rana, 2017). Project Preparation Facilities
are portrayed as particularly important for climate-
vulnerable cities in developing countries, where connect-
ing investorswith bankable projects, administering those
projects, and implementing those projects “requires
skills and expertise that are not immediately available
within municipal administrations” (Gorelick & Walmsley,
2020, p. 120).
The above list is abbreviated, and only begins to
list a few of the many actors involved. As scholars
have suggested, the proliferation of such organizations
represents the emergence of a novel, ambiguous, and
complex landscape of urban climate governance (Chan,
Falkner, Goldberg, & Van Asselt, 2018; Chaudhury, 2020;
Gordon & Johnson, 2017). Numerous scholars have
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created frameworks that attempt to distinguish among
different modes of ‘climate governance orchestration’
and their democratic legitimacy, efficacy, and under-
lying politics and power structures (see for instance,
Abbott, 2017; Bäckstrand et al., 2018; Gordon& Johnson,
2017; Hölscher & Frantzeskaki, 2020; Kuyper, Linnér, &
Schroeder, 2018). Yet each of these studies struggles to
portray a clear and comprehensive picture of the archi-
tecture of this orchestration, and furthermore, many of
these works express concerns about equity, justice, and
democratic legitimacy in climate governance.
However, while a clear picture of this system remains
elusive, certain commonalities point to underlying moti-
vations and potential outcomes, all of which are related.
First, while most of these organizations are transnational
in their scope, nearly all are headquartered in the global
North (Bansard et al., 2017; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Chan
et al., 2018), and as such, reflect a notably western
set of strategies and ideologies. Second, the messaging
found in their mission statements and guidelines largely
reflects the priorities and practices of the most influ-
ential development multilaterals, notably the United
Nations and the World Bank. This includes, for instance,
the use of specific metrics, rationales, administrative
structures, feedback tools, and the employment of an
overall language of inclusion and local participation; it is
worth noting again that the legitimacy of each of these
is highly questionable (Bäckstrand et al., 2018; Kuyper
et al., 2018). Lastly, the vastmajority of these actors have
begun to repeat the resilience-amidst-crisis narrative
of climate urbanism, which assumes that urgent, large-
scale action is needed, that urban infrastructure and
city citizens should be the focal point of these projects,
and that financing these projects is dependent on pro-
viding access to investment capital (in this case, much
of that capital originates in the private sector). This last
part is key, because deference to private interests and a
few notable philanthropic actors has already allowed a
notable degree of elitist influence in development agen-
das (Graham, 2017). In short, the increasing complexity
and lack of accountability in the administration of cli-
mate finance not only forces recipients to acquire the
resources needed to navigate this system, it provides
enormous flexibility to themost powerful and influential
actors to orchestrate a systemof debt finance thatmeets
their own priorities.
The title of this section—orchestrating crisis—is
intended to strike a troubling chord. Read literally, it
implies that the current system of urban climate gov-
ernance plays a role in exacerbating, rather than miti-
gating, the climate crisis. This article suggests that both
are partially true and that this contradiction is impor-
tant to understanding the intractable nature of the cli-
mate crisis. Indeed, the root causes of anthropogenic
climate change are political and systematic. This means
that while modes of governance embedded within those
structures are capable ofmitigating the elemental causes
of climate change (i.e., greenhouse gases), they often
serve to entrench the historical and systematic causes
of the climate crisis (i.e., capitalism, patriarchy, and colo-
nialism; Rice, Long, & Levenda, 2021). The next section
addresses this, and discusses the ways that the climate
crisis is framed as a depoliticized issue solvable by a
mode of urban climate governance that reproduces the
very systems that create crisis, profit from crisis, and
entrench power through crisis.
6. Conclusion: Profit, Power, and the Coloniality of the
Climate Crisis
Interrogating the strategic shift promoted by devel-
opment organizations and their private counterparts
reveals a great deal about the complexity of the cli-
mate crisis—an exercise that is helpful in locating strate-
gies for decolonizing and democratizing climate action.
This section acknowledges some of the contradictions
in the rhetoric of climate development before conclud-
ing with a discussion of pathways forward for action
and intervention.
First, it is imperative to acknowledge the urgency of
the climate crisis. Climate change is indeed an urgent
threat and immediate action is necessary. But framing
the climate crisis as such allows room to expedite unjust
policies, and this rhetoric should be the first area that pol-
icymakers and activists examine for potential abuse. This
is particularly true when urgency is used to justify aus-
tere policies that support themost powerful actors, over-
shadow the injustices that will be heightened by those
policies, and obfuscate the political and historical con-
texts that created these crises in the first place (Long &
Rice, 2020). As Whyte (in press) notes, this is a conscious
tactic that allows policy discussions to completely ignore
the abuses of (continued) colonial power.
Second, cities are indeed logical spaces to prioritize
climate action, but this focus is being implemented in a
myopic manner. The framing of urban action as a prag-
matic way to curb emissions and protect the majority
of the world’s population introduces multiple caveats.
The most obvious of these is that it suggests a false
dichotomy between rural and urban, thereby ignoring
themetabolic and political interrelationships that perme-
ate our climate-changed world. Put another way, issues
such as forced migration, geophysical transformation
(e.g., rising sea levels, erosion, flooding, etc.), the politics
of anticipatory ruination (Paprocki, 2019) and the politi-
cal economy of climate retreat (Scott & Lennon, 2020) all
challenge what we mean by ‘urban.’
Third, while engaging private capital is an impor-
tant component of climate funding, hopes that the pri-
vate sector will emerge as the responsible leader in
just, equitable, and sustainable development are mis-
placed. As the private sector’s role in climate finance
has increased, so has critical scholarship that expresses
concern about equity issues associated with a for-profit
model, their increasing influence in development agen-
das, their lack of meaningful engagement with target
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communities, their tepid progress on adaption projects,
the lack of credible oversight and regulation, and their
overdependence on credit ratings, risk assurances, and
market stability (Bigger & Millington, 2020; Bigger &
Webber, 2020; Clark et al., 2018; Graham, 2017; Hall,
2017; Jones et al., 2020; Kuyper et al., 2018; Pauw,
2015; Walenta, 2018). Furthermore, it is becoming clear
that the emergence of green and sustainable bond mar-
kets as funding mechanisms—orchestrated by institu-
tions like the World Bank—embody what Bigger and
Webber (2020) refer to as ‘Green Structural Adjustment.’
As this article has argued, aspects of the emerging cli-
mate finance system potentially represent a new mode
of colonial control through debt bondage adapted for the
neoliberal era.
Ultimately, the funding strategies that accompany
this resilience-amidst-crisis narrative are not intended to
tackle the complexity of the climate crisis or assist those
most vulnerable. Instead, they are promoted to increase
investment potential and ensure profit, while advanc-
ing a subjective vision of climate action disguised as
global altruism. Confronting this problem requires two-
fold action. While scholars and educators are working
to unmask and abolish the structural power dynamics
in the climate development sector, activists and commu-
nity leaders are working to promote development mod-
els and systems of governance that are inclusive, distribu-
tive, and participatory.
In a practical sense, this requires a significant dis-
ciplining of the financial sector, an empowering of the
public sector, a rethinking of budget priorities toward
resource redistribution, and a meaningful commitment
to transparent democratic engagement. For many of the
influential actors in climate development, this is an uphill
task. Addressing one of thosemeasureswould be viewed
as difficult, addressing more than one would be per-
ceived as radical, addressing all of them would be con-
sidered revolutionary. At the same time, frameworks for
critical intervention already exist (for example: Castán
Broto et al., 2020; Pellow, 2018; Pulido & De Lara, 2018;
Ranganathan & Bratman, 2019; Whyte, 2017), as do
approaches that blend critical theory and practical pol-
icy approaches (for example, recent works on the Green
New Deal and de-growth economics: Arnoff, Battistoni,
Cohen,&Riofrancos, 2019; Goh, 2020; Patel &Goodman,
2020; Rodríguez-Labajos et al., 2019). Additionally, there
are myriad calls for increased regulation of the green
bond market and climate finance more broadly, many
of which have already been cited earlier in this arti-
cle. Not all of these approaches are radical, and some
include more reasonable strategies to engaging the pri-
vate sector (Clark et al., 2018) and even include calls
for reform from within multilateral agencies themselves
(e.g., Fullenkamp & Rochon, 2017).
Admittedly, despite the existence of both practical
and conceptual roadmaps for intervention, the many
historical structures of injustice remain the largest road-
block. The economic imaginaries, inclusions, and exclu-
sions created by the financial sector are deeply embed-
ded in a system of colonial supremacy and racial capital-
ism that will not be dismantled overnight (John, 2018).
Likewise, empowering the public sector must recognize
that the state is itself a historical colonial apparatus
built upon Indigenous theft and violence. However, the
enforcement capabilities of the nation-state, acting on
behalf of the public, hold the sovereign power to disci-
pline and regulate financial institutions, and commit to
transparent, democratic solutions. Ultimately, any solu-
tion to the climate crisis must prioritize a postcolonial
perspective that (1) recognizes the legitimacy of a mul-
titude of climate actions, (2) empowers local knowledge
and decision-making capacity, and (3) makes social jus-
tice concerns paramount (Robin & Castán Broto, 2020).
As Sultana (2019, p. 42) notes, this is an ongoing struggle
that requires collective action:
Decolonizing development is a collective project, not
an individual one, nor one that has a timeframe or
prefigured set of goals. It requires difficult questions
be asked and possibilities envisioned collectively in
order to pursue equitable and emancipatory trans-
formations for planetary justice. Decolonizing has to
be a collaborative journey and a collective struggle of
committed individuals.
The next two decades will determine if the design, fund-
ing, and implementation of climate projects and policies
emerge in a just, democratic, and equitable manner, or
if they materialize in a political economic landscape of
profit, polarization, and segregation. This necessitates
a collective, rather than individual, political project—
one that subverts systems that profit from crisis, rejects
a mentality of resilience-amidst-crisis, and empowers
communities toward collaborative, democratic, and equi-
table climate action.
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